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The policy option of explicit default on internal debt has surfaced for a number of
reasons. The recent inflationary experiences ofLatin American nations are now in themain
determined by the necessary internal transfer ofresources to the government to service the
foreign debt. The consequent increase in internal interest bearing debt further deteriorates
the fiscal situation of the government adding inflationary pressure especially in the context
of indexed government debt. The higher the inflation rate, it is argued, the lower will be
real cash balances and tax receipts (the so-called "Oliveira-Tanzi" effect). Once the
(operational) fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP becomes greater than the maximum
attainable with the inflation tax, the government will have to continuously accelerate the
rate of money growth and thus push the economy into a hyperinflation. In order to stem
this "inevitable" movement toward hyperinflation, some have argued that not only a
moratorium on external public sector debt but also a moratorium ofsome form on internal
public sector debt is necessary to decrease the inflationary internal transfer [Zini Jr., 1989].
Subsequently, bothArgentina (December 1989 and January 1990) and Brazil (March 1990)
have "confiscated" a large portion of the governments liabilities to avoid the increasing
refinancing difficulties.
A large amount of current research has looked at the effects of internal debt
'The"OrloffEffect" is named after a television commercial for OrloffVodka inBrazil. Thecommercial
has a young man drinking vodka who sees an old man as his reflection in the mirror. The young man, taken
aback, says" Who are you?" The old man replies "1 am you tomorrow." The analogy in this context is that
whatever happens inArgentina will happen to Brazil in the future, e.g. "heterodox shock", hyperinflation, foreign
and domestic debt repudiation, etc.
1problems by decreasing interest and amortization payments. This allegedly alleviates the
necessity to continually accelerate the domestic inflation rate to [mance internal debt
service.
This paper takes a critical view toward such policies. The fact that the internal debt
joined the external debt of these countries as a major source of government financial
problems does not imply that partial or full repudiation of the governments obligations is
a reasonable policy alternative. This paper argues that internal debt repudiation may do
more harm than good except under the unlikely scenario where governments are forced to
completely balance their budget. The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly
describes some theoretical reasons why this is the case. Section II shows what one should
expect from moratoria from the recent experiences ofArgentina and Brazil while section
III describes briefly the policies implemented in late 1989 in Argentina and in early 1990
in Brazil and the outcomes ofthese policies to date. Section IV summarizes and concludes
the paper.
I Some Theoretical Considerations
The theoretical reasoning of these "forced refinancing" policies centers on the
possible existence of either a continual acceleration of the inflation rate due purely to
specnlative reasons, i.e. a rational inflationary bubble, or a continual increase in the real
stock of internal debt, i.e. a rational debt bubble, or both. Before embarking on a
repudiation, however, one would first have to show that either of these bubbles exist and
380% ofits total foreign debt outstanding, the necessity to meet foreign debt service created
a large fiscal burdenwhich tax receipts could notcover. The government has had to borrow
heavily by issuing indexed government debt at relatively high interest ratesto meetthis debt
service in addition to increasing the monetary base [Welch, Primo Braga, and Andre 1987
and Welch 1990].
Inflation indexing (created in the late 1960s as a "temporary" measure) coupled with
the fact that the financial system increased the liquidity of government bonds over the
periodwere necessary to affect the internal transfer ofresources to the government so that
it could meet foreign debt service (the external transfer).' Financial institutions were able
to "capture" some of the inflation tax by intermediating via repurchase agreements in the
so-called "overnight" market between final borrowers and the government as well as
financing asset positions with "free" funds such as demand deposits, tax float ( tax receipts
collected by banks not yet disbursed to the government), etc. This allowed the Brazilian
government to transfer resources to itselfnot only through the mechanism ofborrowing but
also because it essentially kept individuals transacting in domestic assets as opposed to
foreign ones. The arrangement allowed banks to profit from the internal transfer process
as well as increase the influence offinancial institutions over the Central Bank's monetary
policies.' Not only did the efficiency ofthe financial sector suffer but also the existence of
'The increase in liquidity of this debt was not due purely to the actions ofbanks and depositors alone.
In 1979 the Central Bank instituted a policy which essentially meant that the Central Bank would stand ready
at the end of the day to enter into 24 hour repurchase agreements with commercial banks if they could not
finance their position in indexed government bonds. This meant that changes in "overnight" market conditions
translated into increases and decreases in bank reserves, i.e. monetarybase. This practicewas eliminated inJuly
1990 after public critique as found in Brand1io (1989) and Pastore (1990).
'For a full analysis ofBrazilian financial development, see Welch (1991a).
6financial asset indexation created additional inflation feedback mechanisms [Baer and
Beckerman 1980; Baer and Welch 1987]. As can be seen in table 1, Brazilian government
internal public sector debt grew from around 13% of GOP in 1982 to 21.1% of GOP in
1985.
TheArgentine road to financial collapse in the early 19805 is well documented [Felix
1986, Oiaz-Alejandro 1985, Corbo, de Melo, and Tybout 1986, and Calvo 1986]. Between
1976 and 1977, interest rates were liberated on most deposits and loans, reserve
requirements were lowered, and barriers to entry lowered to decentralize the banking
system. Most controls on capital movements were removed by 1979. Stabilization policies
were also imposed at the same time as the reforms. Initially (before 1978), the stabilization
policy was "orthodox" in nature with fiscal reforms and restrictive monetary policy. The
combination offinancial liberalization and austere monetary and, to a lesser extent, fiscal
policies caused real interest rates to rise significantly. Foreign financing was cheaper than
domestic and a large inflow of foreign loans occurred mainly intermediated by domestic
commercial banks. As there was an explicit and full deposit insurance program, over-
lending and risk taking occurred.
The initial phase of the stabilization policy was successful in dampening balance of
payments problems but inflation remained high. Policy makers turned to the "expectations
management" approach to inflation stabilization in late 1978. As the country had achieved
a degree of openness, policy makers believed that if the exchange-rate was allowed to
depreciate at increasingly slower rates, international competition would ensure that the
domestic rate ofinflation would converge to the international rate of inflation [Fernandez
7initiated.'exchange rate and restrictive monetary policy caused lending rates to rise dramatically
pushing increasing numbers of firms into default. The second financial crisis was
precipitated at the end of the "tablita" with the large devaluations and the consequent
increase in the domestic currency cost offoreign debt service.
Confidence inthe financial system and the exchange rateregime disappearedleading
to massive capital flight. As foreign reserves dropped and the threat of more bank runs
lurked around the comer, policy makers attempted to index [mancial assets to the inflation
rate and liquidate the bad debts ofthe banking system. In 1982, interest rate controls were
reinstated, deposit insurance restricted, formal indexation of financial assets created, an
insured exchange rate created, 100% reserve requirements imposed and a rediscount facility
("prestamo basico") instated at the Central Bank.
The total lack of confidence in the Argentine financial sector kept financial
indexation from being undertaken on a wide scale except under the auspices of the
refinancing of loans or in assets which could be held as reserves against deposits. Even
indexation and government guarantees on financial assets could not stem the capital flight.
The refinancing effectively transferred what had been privately contracted foreign debt to
the government. Further, the fact thatthe transfer entailed the Central Bank's commitment
to float bankswhich were essentiallybankruptplagued the subsequentstabilizationattempts
as this proved to be a major source of endogenous money growth.
6
6During the fmancial liberalization of the 1970s, commercial banks were put at a competitive
disadvantage as non-bank fmancial intermediaries were not required to hold reserves against deposit liabilities.
The Central Bank moved to remunerate required reserves on all commercial bank deposits through what carne
tobecalled the"CuentaRegulaci6n Monetaria" orthe"MonetaryRegulationAccount." The account was funded
by a fee on "lending ability" of the fmancial institutions based upon demand deposits. Portfolio shifts between
demand deposits an other assets, therefore, had direct effects upon the monetary base. A shift out ofdemand
9The lack of confidence in government financial instruments inArgentina, at least in
part, stems from the transferral of the private sector's poor financial position to the public
sector. Herein lies the source ofArgentina's transfer problem as opposed to Brazil's where
the majority ofthe public sector's foreign debt was contracted directly by the public sector.
The fact that private sector foreign debt in Argentina was transferred to the public sector
before full gestation ofthe investment goes far in explaining why Brazil was able to convert
a larger portion of its foreign debt into "productive assets" than Argentina and, hence, the
Brazilians' higher level of confidence in the financial system.
The Argentine adjustment entailed a de !OC(O internal moratorium through the
liquidation of private sector debt through the rediscount facilities. The ability of the
Argentine government to borrow using debt instruments internally was severely
compromised. The Brazilian government avoided this problem as most ofthe external debt
was contracted by the public sector and the orthodox adjustment policies initiated in 1982
did not bring the financial system to collapse.7~ The Braziliangovernment, therefore, could
"smooth" inflation tax "collection" through the issuance ofindexed bonds. Argentina, on the
deposits pushes the "Cuenta" into deficit automatically increasing the monetary base through the (net) payment
ofinterest on bank reserves. These deficits make up part ofwhat is called the "quasi-fiscal deficit" ofthe Central
Bank whieh measures the loses accruing to the Central Bank through its fmancial operations. The liquidation
of debt after the financial crisis of 1981-82 exacerbated the size of the Central Banks deficit and compromised
later attempts at inflation stabilization [Feldman and Summer 1986: 42-45; L6pez Murphy 1984; Piekarz 1984;
and Piekarz 1987].
7This is not to say that the Brazilian private sector firms and fmancial intermediaries did not have
problems. The Brazilian government intervened in a relatively surgical way, however, through helping the
absorption ofbankrupt compauies by other firms or into the private sector. See Welch (1991a).
·"Inflation expectations management" was briefly undertaken by the Brazilian government in 1980
through the pre-fixing of inflation indexing at 50% for the year on financial instruments. This caused a large
flight from fmancial assets and an acceleration of inflation to over 100%. This poliey was adjusted then later
abandoned in 1981. For a more detailed discussion, see Welch (1991a).
10other hand, could rely only on theinflation tax to finance deficits, explaining the stylized fact
that Argentina is more prone to hyperinflationary outbursts.
11b. Heterodox Policies: the Plano Cruzado and Plano Austral
Briefly, the relevance ofthese policies to the currentproblemlies inthe fact that the
inflation tax revenue fell inboth Argentina (1985) and Brazil (1986) with the imposition of
incomes policies and monetary reforms in spite of the increase in inflation tax base ( the
monetary base)" In Brazil, the Cruzado Plan dismantled the formal inflation indexation
of financial assets. By mid-summer, however, the seeds of reindexation had taken root as
the goverument did not effectively complement the policies with fiscal reform and the
current account ofthebalance ofpayments began to deteriorate. Further, inJune 1986, the
Central Bank issued short-term floating rate Letras do Banco Central (LBCs) in exchange
for the non-indexed Obrigac;;oes do Tesouro Nacional (OTN). The conversion involved a
capital loss on OTNs. By December, more than half the bond debt was held in LBCs
(World Bank 1987: 44). Inflation accelerated to higher levels in 1987 when another
"heterodox shock" deindexation in June ofthat year. Its fate was the same as the Cruzado.
By early 1988, the economy was fully reindexed. A "beans and rice" strategy of monetary
tightness without fiscal reform was pursued throughout 1988. By the end of1988, inflation
had clearly accelerated to a much higher level and fears of hyperinflation abounded.
Anotherincomespolicycum deindexationwith restrictive monetarypolicywas implemented
in January 1989 ( the Plano Verao or "summer plan"). It was abandoned in June of 1989
when the economy experienced yet another reindexation. Restrictive monetary policy was
imposed to keep the economyfrom moving into hyperinflation until the new administration
·See Welch, Braga, and Andre (1987) concerning the Brazilian case.
12took over in March 1990.
With each subsequent unraveling of the heterodox stabilizations, the inflation rate
accelerated to a new level. A march to hyperinflation seemed evident especially whenever
the (armualized) monthlyinflationrate exceeded the constant inflation ratewhich maximizes
inflation tax revenue (optimistically) estimated to be from 1500% to 2000% per year for
Brazil. The tampering with the real return to government debt implicit in these policies
caused Brazil to experience aneverincreasing amountofcapitalflight, somethingheretofore
alien to the Brazilianstabilization experience. Thefear ofexplicit internal debt repudiation
reached its peak during the months preceding the elections causing real interestrates onthe
internal debt to increase and fears of an internal debt interest rate led hyperinflation
mounted [Martone 1989 and Toledo 1989].
The Austral Plan lasted longer than each of the Brazilian attempts at deindexation,
roughly three years from 1985 to early 1987. However, the necessity of the Argentine
government to both transfer resources abroad and liquidate a portion the private sector's
liabilities encouraged a quick flight from monetary base, a complete reindexation of the
economy, and significant growth of the internal debt [Cavallo 1989: 123-150 and Dagnino
Pastore 1988: 273-292].
The dismantling of the Austral Plan in 1987 did not lead to another stabilization
attempt until after the September 1987 elections. In October, an attempt at stabilization
was made with a larger devaluation of the Austral, increases in public sector prices,
promised fiscal reform, tighter monetary policy, and a freeing of interest rates. The
stabilization was largely unsuccessful as inflation accelerated in 1988 due to the inflationary
13consequence of the devaluation and monetary growth.
In August of 1988 the "Primavera Plan" (or "Spring Plan") was instituted hinging on
a devaluation coupled with a multiple exchange rate system and instituting a crawling peg
[Beckerman 1990: 9-10]. The exchange rate system allowed the Central Bank to earn an
operating profit by purchasing foreign exchange at the official exchange rate and selling
foreign exchange in the parallel market. Aspects of prior stabilizations were also present
in the Primavera Plan such as increases in public sector prices, wage and price guidelines,
intended fiscal reform, and a pre-announced exchange rate devaluation. As in the earlier
"tablita" experiment, the austral became overvalued could only be maintained by high real
interest rates. Effective fiscal reform, however, did not materialize and the exchange rate
regime came under pressure inlate 1988 [Beckerman 1990:11-12]. This pressure culminated
in a devaluation of the Austral in February 1989. The approaching May 1989 presidential
election complicated further stabilization efforts especially due to the criticism leveled by
the Radical party candidate Eduardo Angeloz against the Alfonsin administration's
economic team. The economic team consequently resigned in April [Manzetti and Snow
1992: 62] and the Alfonsin administration lost control ofeconomic policy. Argentinamoved
toward hyperinflation. Needless to say, Angeloz lost the election to Carlos Menem. The
inflation rate reached almost 200% (46,350,329.3% at an armual rate) during President
Menem's first month in office, July 1990.
Menem ironically installed economists from the Argentine multinational firm Bunge
y Borne who quickly implemented a plan to avert hyperinflation. Stabilization was then
achieved by first stabilizing the exchange rate then creating dollar denominated deposits.
14The administration then administered another set ofwage and price agreements in August
and pushed an "emergency" economic bill through congress which addressed public sector
reform through streamlining public enterprise and privatization in addition to introducing
a generalized value-added tax [Beckerman 1990: 11-13]. The stabilization lasted until
November 1989. A devaluation at the beginning ofDecember and the forced refinancing
of dollar-denominated government bonds (BONEX) to save foreign exchange reserves
caused a run ontheaustral and a returnofhyperinflation [TheEconomist Investigative Unit
1990].
III Hyperinftation, Internal Debt Moratorium and "Liquidity Confiscation"
The perception that the increase in the monetary base when interest payments on
internal government debt came due and the difficulties in rolling over this debt at high real
interest rates has led to explicit internal debt repudiationinboth Brazil and Argentina. The
specifics ofthe events leading up to the moratoria, however, are different in bothcountries.
A brief description of these events follows.
Although Argentina's internal debt is small relative to Brazil's, the large size of
payments on government bonds and 7-day accounts ("plazo fijo") in the context of
accelerating inflationled the forced exchange ofshort-termdollar denominated debt for 20-
year dollar denominated debt in December and the forced exchange of7-day accounts for
lO-year BONEX in January. The program effectively "confiscated" liquidity from the
economy. The events leading to the forced refinancing of these financial assets dates to
15November. Speculation against the currency in November put pressure onthe government
todevalue the Austral and eventually led to the resignation ofCentral BankpresidentJavier
GonzaIez Fraga. InDecember, economy minister N~storRapanelli responded by devaluing
the Austral by 34.9%, reducing import tariffs by 10 percentage points, raising export duties
by 11 percentage points, and raising public sector tariffs dramatically [Latin American
Monitor, January 1990: 737-738]. The other major action was the forced rescheduling of
maturing government bond debt into 20 year BONEX.
These measures did not stem the run onthe Austral. AfterRapanelli's "resignation"
inDecember,new economy ministerAntonioErman GonzaIez introduced a unified floating
exchange rate, rescinded the increase in export taxes and decrease in import tariffs,
performed a partial about-face on the internal debt rescheduling by declaring that some
bond holders would be paidincash, and promised no further restrictions on the withdrawals
of funds form the financial system. Currency markets entered a temporary calm before
Christmas as the Central Bank increased interest rates dramatically. After Christmas, the
dollar surged again. Rumors ofa "dollarization" plan fueled a dramatic run onthe currency.
The plan meant to fix wages, public sector tariffs and other key prices in terms of U.S.
dollars, fix the quantity ofAustrales incirculation, and allow free conversion atthe exchange
rate of the day. Speculation about the final value of the exchange rate fueled the run on
the Central Bank and hyperinflation [Latin American Monitor, January 1990: 738-739).
As ofthe newyear, the dollarization planwas dropped infavor ofanotherplanwhich
would severely reduce the supply ofAustrales in circulation. Firstly, the government would
printno money over and above that needed to paywages and pensions. Secondly, the 7-day
16(plazo fijo) holders were allowed to withdraw around US$500 from the accounts the
remainder ofwhich was then (forcedly) transformed into lo-year dollar denominated bonds
(BONEX Series 89). The dollar immediately collapsed. The new minimum term for
depositswas lengthened to 90 days. The confiscation of7-day accounts amounted to a US$3
billion removal ofliquid assets from the economy. Furtherrefinancings occurred in October
of 1990 when Erman Gonziilez converted US$8 billion in frozen debts to contractors and
others into lO-year negotiable indexed government bonds with a real interest rate of 8%
[Latin American Monitor, October 1990: 822].
As predicted by the discussion above, the value of the government bonds fell
dramatically. Further, real interest rates rose to very high levels. Table 8 shows monthly
(consumer price) inflation rates from May 1989 to February 1991. Significant inflation
reduction did not occur until April 1990. This was achieved at the cost ofvery high real
interest rates, a fall in gross domestic product from November 1989 to November 1990 of
4.6%, and a large withdrawal of funds from the financial system. For example, by April
1990, total deposits in the banking system had reportedly fallen by 75% [Latin American
Monitor, April 1990: 762]. These funds either left the country in the form of capital flight
or U.S. dollar purchases. The alleviation of pressure on the Treasury's budget was only
temporary as the budget turned negative in November 1990. Although inflation fell during
the second half of 1990, they are not inflation rates which one would call "reasonable" for
such a large violation of property rights. At the beginning of 1991, a new wave of runs
against the Austral took place in recent weeks and Argentina has returned to a
hyperinflationary state. The Austral fell around 40% against the dollar in January 1991
17(M,)
Prinlo Braga (1990), and Yoshino (1990).
"The viewpoints of both Amato and Lula tend to be extreme. A general view of the situation lies
somewhere in between the two.
18By May and June, the economy had found new sources ofliquidity. The source was
the loopholes introduced in the original legislation concerning the withdrawal of frozen
funds. After a clamping down on these loopholes and a reform of the Central Banks
operations inthe openmarket, the CentralBankpursueda stronglycontraetionarymonetary
policy. InSeptember the Central Bankrecalculated -in effect raised -reserve requirements.
Real interest rates rose even higher than they already had been and the economy slipped
into a deep recession.
Business production showed highly variable movements from the onset of the plan,
being susceptible to the general amount of liquidity in the economy. Output initially fell,
recovered in August and September then deteriorated toward the end of 1990. By the end
of 1990, the Brazilian economy was headed for a severe recession. The fall in business
activity from January 1990 to January 1991 was 4.64%.
As table 6 indicates, inflation fell from a high in March 1990 of 84% to around 8%
in May 1990. The initial success ofthe Brazilian plan compared to the Argentine plan can
be explained by the relatively large portion ofwealth held domestically in Brazil compared
to Argentina. The confiscation ofwealth, therefore, was much largerin Brazil. The money
supply, however, began to grow extremely fast starting in September 1990. Since May,
however, inflation has steadily accelerated to a rate ofaround 22% in February 1991. The
severe acceleration of inflation led to a new attempt at inflation stabilization through
deindexation ofthe economy and wage and price controls in February 1991. Unfortunately,
the credibility ofthe Collor administration has all butvanished. His party suffered defeats
in the senatorial and gubernatorial elections in November. An opinion poll of 16 states
20reveals that no more than 25% ofthe population supports the Collor plan [LatinAmerican
Monitor December 1990: 849]. The governess of Sao Paulo broke the wage and price
guidelines early in the plan. As of April 1991, the government is having difficulties
maintaining price controls.
IV Final Comments
The theoretical analysis above indicates that an explicit internal debt moratorium
without fiscal reform is not a viable policy to combat hyperinflation. The Argentine
experience of the early 1980s relative to Brazil's seems to bear this out. The "success" or
"failure" of the current programs which include explicit internal debt moratorium depend
ultimately on the profundity and credibility offiscal reform. Ifall that is needed is a fiscal
reform, however, the moratoria may have introduced an unnecessary element ofinstability,
especially in the Brazilian case. One could argue that the measures taken were necessary
to allow the public sector to buy enough time in order to implement successful fiscal reform.
This line of argument was one of the main motivations for the "heterodox" stabilization
experiments in both countries. Overall fiscal reform went to the wayside when inflation
stopped due to wage and price controls only to become a pressing issue when inflation
accelerated after the dismantling of these programs. These "new" programs based upon
liquidity confiscation, however, display the same type of time inconsistency. The initial
(limited) success leads the government to delay fiscal reform.
A credible and lasting public sector reform has not taken place in either country. In
21Table 1
Brazil: Public Sector Net Debt as a Percentage ofGDP





















Banco Central do Brasil: Brasil: Programa Econllmico. March 1990.
23Table 2
Argentina: Public Sector Net Debt as a Percentage of GDP
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(a) Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(1989): Economicand Social Progress
in Latin America,
24Table 3
Brazil: Public Sector Deficit and Interest Burden on Internal and External Debt
(as a percentage of GDP)
Year Deqcit(' Internal Extema Total 2/1 3/1 4/1




1981 5.20 1.50 2.08 3.58 0.29 0.40 0.69
1982 7.00 2.37 2.49 4.86 0.34 0.36 0.69
1983 3.50 3.06 3.22 4.83 0.87 0.92 1.38
1984 2.70 3.30 3.14 6.44 1.22 1.16 2.38
1985 4.30 3.44 2.97 6.41 0.80 0.69 1.49
1986 3.50 2.23 2.51 4.74 0.64 0.72 1.35
1987 5.50 2.17 2.10 4.27 0.39 0.38 0.78






Celso L Martone: Fiscal Policy and Stabilization in Brazil. Working Paper
#50, The World Bank and Alvaro A. Zini Junior : "Fundar a Divida,"
Inforroa~6es FIPE, January 1989.
25Table 4
Argentina: Public Sector Deficit and Interest Burden on Internal and External Debt
(as a percentage of GDP)






1981 13.3 5.17 2.23 7.40 0.39 0.17 0.56
1982 14.9 5.72 4.66 10.37 0.38 0.31 0.70
1983 15.6 0.94 5.02 5.96 0.06 0.32 0.38
1984 12.6 0.80 4.16 4.95 0.06 0.33 0.39
1985 6.10 0.78 4.67 5.45 0.13 0.77 0.89
1986 4.70 0.30 3.42 3.72 0.06 0.73 0.79
1987 7.38 0.66 2.72 3.38 0.09 0.37 0.46
1988 5.10 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1989 7.10 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sources: WorldBank(1987): Argentina: EconomicRecoveIY and Growth. (Washington
D.C.: The World Bank) and Jose Marfa Fanelli and Omar O. Chisari:
"Restricciones al CrescimientoyDistribuciondelIngreso: ElCasoArgentino,"
Working Paper, CEDES, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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(a) Wholesale Prices measured by the Indice de Pre~os por Atacado
Funda~ao GetUlio Vargas.
27Table 6
Brazil: Monthly Inflation Rates June 1989 to February 1991
Month Monthly Inflation Monthly Last 12
Inflation Months
(annualized)
1989 June 26.77 1,622.6
July 29.03 2,029.5
August 30.95 2,442.5 1,084.0
September 35.83 3,844.1 1,198.0
October 37.62 4,515.1 1,303.8
November 41.42 6,299.3 1,464.2
December 53.55 17,079.0 1,764.9
1990 January 56.11 20,849.3 1,609.7
February 72.78 70,681.8 2,751.3
March 84.32 153,669.3 4,853.9
April 44.80 8,396.2. 6,584.6
May 7.87 148.2 6,458.7
June 9.55 198.8 5,657.3
July 12.92 329.8 4,947.8
August 12.06 292.1 4,272.3
September 12.76 332.1 3525.44
October 14.20 392.0 2,909.30
November 15.58 468.8 2,359.45
December 18.30 651.3 1,794.75
1991 January 19.91 783.6 1,355.38
February 21.87 974.4 926.60
Notes:
Source:
(a) ConsumerPrices measured by the Indice de Pre\ios ao Consumidor
Funda\i3.o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Economia
28Table 7

















Argentina: Monthly Inflation Rates June 1989 to December 1991
Month Monthly Inflation Monthly Last 12 Months
Inflation
(annualized)
1989 May 78.5 104,530.6 765
June 114.5 798,899.7 1,472
July 196.6 46,350,329.3 3,611
August 37.9 4,629.0 3,909
September 9.4 193.9 3,825
October 5.8 96.7 3,726
November 6.5 112.9 3,731
December 40.1 5,618.2 4,924
1990 January 79.2 109,532.0 8,165
February 61.6 31,617.3 12,085
March 95.5 311,617.5 20,263
April 11.4 265.3 16,903
May 13.6 361.9 10,724
June 13.9 376.7 6,071
July 10.8 242.3 2,048
August 15.3 452.0 1,697
September 15.9 487.5 1,410
October 7.7 143.6 1,437
November 8.2 172.1 1,461
December 4.7 73.5 1,067
1991 January 7.7 143.5 797.1
February 27.0 1,660.5 535.8
~otes: (a Consumer J:'nces
Source: INDEC
30REFERENCES
Alesina, Alberto (1988): 'The End of Large Public Debts," in Luigi Spaventa, ed.: High
Public Debt: The Italian Experience. (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Baer, Werner and Paul Beckerman (1980): "The Trouble with Index-Linking: Reflections
on the Recent Brazilian Experience," World Development, Vol. 8, No.9.
Baer, Werner and John H. Welch, eds. (1987): "The Resurgence of Inflation in Latin
America," special edition of World Development, Vol. 15, No.8.
Beckerman, Paul (1990): "Recent Heterodox Stabilization Experience," paper presented
at the Conference on The Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s and the
Opportunities ofthe I990s at University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, October
1990.
Blanchard, Oliver J. and Stanley Fischer (1989): Lectures on Macroeconomics.
(Cambridge: The MIT Press).
Brandao, Carlos (1989): "A Divida PUblica Interna, Seus Problemas, e SoIUl;;6es: I and
II," Conjuntura Economica, October and November.
Bruno, Michael and Stanley Fischer (1990): "Seignorage, Operating Rules, and the High
Inflation Trap," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, May.
Calvo, Guillermo A. (1986): "Fractured Liberalism under Martinez de Hoz," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 34, No.3, April.
----- (1988): "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic
Review, September.
----- (1989): "Is Inflation Effective for Liquidating Short-Term Nominal Debt?" IMF Staff
Papers, Vol. 36, No.4, December.
Cavallo, Domingo (1989): Economfa en Tiempos de Crisis. (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Sudamericana).
Chari, V.V. (1988): "Time Consistency and Optimal Policy Design," Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Fall.
Corbo, Vittorio, Jaime de Melo, and James Tybout (1986): "What Went Wrong with the
Recent Reforms in the Southern Cone?" in Economic Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. 34, No.3, April.
Dagnino Pastore, Jose M. (1988): Cronicas Economicas: Argentina 1969-1988. (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Crespillo).Dornbusch, Rudiger (1989): "Argentina After Martinez de Hoz, 1981-3," in Guido Di
Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch, eds.: The Political Economy ofArgentina, 1946-83.
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).
Diaz·Alejandro, Carlos (1985): "Good Bye Financial Repression and Hello Financial
Crash," in Journal ofDevelopment Economics, Vol. 19.
Economist Intelligence Unit (1990): Argentina: Country Report, Nos. 1 and 2.
Fanelli, Jose M. and Omar O. Chisari (1989): "Restricciones al Crescimiento y
Distribucion del Ingreso: El Caso Argentino," paper presented at the LASA XV
Congress, Miami, November 1989.
Feldman, Ernesto, and Summer, Juan (1986): Crisis Financiera y Endeudamiento Extemo
en la Argentina. (Buenos Aires: Centro de Econornia Transnacional).
Felix, David (1986): "On Financial Blowups and Authoritarian Regimes in latin
America" in Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel Morley, eds.: LatinAmerican Political
Economy: Financial Crises and Political Change. (Boulder: Westview Press).
Fernandez, Roque B. (1985): "The Expectations Management Approach to Stabilization
in Argentina 1976-82," World Development, Vol. 13, No.8, August.
latin American Monitor., various issues.
LOpez Murphy, Ricardo (1984): "Aspectos Fiscales de la Cuenta Regulacion Monetaria,"
Ensayos Economicos. No. 31, September.
Manzetti, Luigi, and Peter Snow (1992): Parties and Power Contenders in Argentine
Politics. (New York: Praeger Publishers, forthcoming).
Martone, Celso L. (1989): "Polftica Monetaria e Juros Reais," Working Paper, University
of Sao Paulo.
···--(1990): "Oberservas;6es Sobre 0 Plano Collor," Working Paper, University of Sao
Paulo.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (1983): "Speculative Hyperinflations in
Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them Out? Journal ofPolitical Economy, Vol.
91, No.4.
Pastore, Affonso Celso (1990): "A Reforma Monetaria do Plano Collor," Working Paper,
University of Sao Paulo.Piekarz, Julio a. (1984): "Compensaci6n de Reservas de Efectivo Minimo: La Cuenta
Regulaci6n Monetaria, el Resultado Cuasi Fiscal del Banco Central y la
Transformaci6n del Sistema Financiero Argentino," Ensayos Economicos. No. 31,
September.
----- (1987): "El Deficit Cuasi Fiscal del Banco Central," Working Paper, Banco Central
de la Republica Argentina.
Prescott, Edward C. (1977): "Should Control Theory Be Used for Economic
Stabilization," in Karl Brunner and Alan Meltzer, eds., Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 7.
Primo Braga, Carlos A (1990): "Brazil in the '90s: The Implications of the Collor Plan,"
The Johns Hopkins University School ofAdvanced International Studies Center
ofBrazilian Studies Occasional Paper Series No. 14, June.
Sargent, Thomas and Neil Wallace (1981): "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Fall.
Toledo, Joaquim El6i C. (1989): "A Inevitavel Acelerac;ao," InfonnClfOes FIPE, June.
Tybout, James (1986): "A Firm Level Chronicle of Financial Crisis in the Southern
Cone," inJournal ofDevelopment Economics, Vol. 24,
Welch, John H. (1990a) "Foreign Debt Burden and Financial Markets in Latin America,
" in Werner Baer and Donald V. Coes, eds. United States Policies and the Latin
American Economies. (New York: Praeger).
----- (1990b): "Monetary Policy, Hyperinflation, and Internal Debt Moratoria in
Argentina and Brazil," Working Paper, University of North Texas.
----. (1991a): Capital Markets in the Development Process: The Case ofBrazil. (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press).
----- (1991b): "Rational Inflation and Real Internal Debt Bubbles in Argentina and
Brazil?" Working Paper, University of North Texas.
Welch, John H., Carlos A. P. Braga, and Paulo T.A Andre (1987): "Brazilian Public
Sector Disequilibrium," in World Development, Vol. 15, No.8.
World Bank (1987): Argentina: Economic Recovery and Growth. (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank), p.7.
The Wall Street Journal, various issues.Yoshino, Joe A (1990): "Comentarios Sobre 0 Plano de Estabiliza~ao do Govemo
Collor," Working Paper, University of Sao Paulo.
Zini Jr., Alvaro A (1989): "Fundar a Divida," InfonnUfoes FIPE, January.RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
Available, at no charge, from the Research Department







Another Look at the Credit-Output Link (Cara S. Lown and Donald W.
Hayes)
Demographics and the Foreign Indebtedness of the United States (John
K. Hill)
Inflation, Real Interest Rates, and the Fisher Equation Since 1983
(Kenneth M. Emery)
Banking Reform (Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr.)
U.S. Oil Demand and Conservation (S.P.A. Brown and Keith R. Phillips)
9006 Are Net Discount Ratios Stationary?:
Value Calculations (Joseph H. Haslag,
Slottje)
The Implications for Present
Michael Nieswiadomy and D.J.
9007 The Aggregate Effects of Temporary Government Purchases (Mark A.
Wynne)
9008 Lender of Last Resort: A Contemporary Perspective (George G. Kaufman)
9009 Does It Matter How Monetary Policy is Implemented? (Joseph H. Haslag
and Scott E. Hein)
9010 The Impact of Differential Human Capital Stocks on Club Allocations
(Lori L. Taylor)
9011 Is Increased Price Flexibility Stabilizing? The Role of the Permanent








Fisher Effects and Central Bank Independence (Kenneth M. Emery)
Methanol as an Alternative Fuel (Mine K. Yucel)
Large Shocks, Small Shocks, and Economic Fluctuations: Outliers in
Macroeconomic Time Series (Nathan S. Balke and Thomas B. Fomby)
Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implications for U.S.
and Canadian Bilateral Trade Flows (David M. Gould)
Government Purchases and Real Wages (Mark Wynne)
Evaluating Monetary Base Targeting Rules (R.W. Hafer, Joseph H. Haslag
and Scott E. Hein)
Variations in Texas School Quality (Lori L. Taylor and Beverly J. Fox)
9106 What Motivates Oil Producers?: Testing Alternative Hypotheses (Carol
Dahl and Mine Yucel)9107 Hyperinflation, and Internal Debt Repudiation in Argentina and Brazil:
From Expectations Management to the "Bonex" and "Collor
ll Plans (John
H. Welch)